



1) Introduction – the issue of innateness
Is the concept of innateness still of any serious interest? Many think not. It is now a truism that both genes and environment causally contribute to the development of any trait, so what scientific motivation could there be to single out just one of those factors in isolation? Moreover, recent theory has cast doubt even on the special role previously allotted to genes over environment in evolution. Continued invocation of innateness, on this view, now serves only to confuse.

And yet, notwithstanding its poor current standing within molecular genetics and parts of evolutionary theory, in other life sciences the notion of innateness remains central. In cognitive science, the nativism-empiricism dichotomy remains at the heart of current debate. (Ariew 2007) argues that the correct theory of innateness sheds light on the nativism controversy surrounding first language acquisition, for instance. Innateness or closely related notions such as genetic ‘hard-wiring’ or ‘programming’ also remain central to fields such as ethology, behavioral ecology and biological anthropology. Quantitative genetics sponsors twin and other studies, aimed at estimating scores for heritability. More widely, new findings linking genes with particular phenotypic traits are being made all the time, both epidemiological ones at the population level and gene-finding studies at the individual-gene level. It seems that innateness is not dead yet after all.

Nevertheless, it remains controversial just what innateness is. A huge range of definitions has accumulated in the philosophy, biology and psychology literatures. (Mameli and Bateson 2006), for example, survey no fewer than 26 different candidates. They narrow the field to a discussion only of plausible “finalists” – of which it turns out there are still eight. Even these eight overlap each other only partially and none has achieved consensus approval. Yet the debate is urgent, both scientifically and for policy, so it is correspondingly urgent that its philosophical underpinnings be properly cleaned up.

In this paper, I aim to do that by offering a definition radically different from predecessors. It accommodates some of the central concerns of innateness skeptics, even while making clear how nevertheless the concept remains useful and so survives. The key to squaring the circle will be to import influential recent work on causal explanation. Despite its venerability, the innateness debate has never been properly connected to this relevant philosophical literature. By bridging the gap, I contend, we may avoid the many misconceptions and confusions that have plagued the issue, from friend and foe alike.

My thesis is that ascriptions of innateness are best seen as explanatory claims; in particular, a trait is innate, roughly speaking, just in case it is explained by genes or it is not explained by environment. The greater novelty lies in how this idea is made precise. The detailed account that I shall develop has three main features, all of which are (to my knowledge) entirely novel​[1]​:
1) A relational definition of innateness that embeds the notion in the general theory of causal explanation. An implication will be that no trait is innate always and everywhere. Rather, every trait may be either innate or non-innate, depending on explanatory context. A welcome further consequence is the flexibility to successfully analyze borderline cases, i.e. traits that intuition does not immediately label one way or the other.
2) An analysis of innate dispositions, as opposed to innate traits. Previous accounts have neglected the distinction between the two. Yet, I shall argue, a full account of innateness and its role in science requires that this distinction be highlighted and properly analyzed.
3) A new account of the role of the concept of innateness in science. In particular, I propose viewing it as a higher-level predicate. Standard anti-reductionist arguments then make clear why it is useful to science. It also becomes clear why this is so even if we accept the substance of several skeptical objections; indeed, many of those objections are actually endorsed. Further, it is also thereby clarified what ascriptions of innateness do not tell us.

The paper is organized as follows. The first half develops a formal definition of an innate trait. In particular, in sections 2 to 4 respectively, I apply the relevant literature on causal explanation; state a definition; and clarify its relational implications. In section 5, I use the definition to anchor an analysis of innate dispositions. In section 6, I turn explicitly to the large existing literature on innateness, explaining how my own definition captures the central motivating ideas of its predecessors. In section 7, I then explain the role that results for innateness in science. Finally, in section 8, I return to the skeptical worries mentioned at the beginning, before in section 9 concluding.


2) Innateness and causal explanation
The core of this paper will be to analyze ascriptions of innateness as explanatory claims. To that end, I shall adopt the leading contemporary theory of causal explanation, which attributes to such explanations a contrastive structure – a cause-rather-than-contrast explains an effect-rather-than-contrast. To illustrate, consider the claim ‘Socrates sipping hemlock explains why he died’. This sounds plausible enough, but consider two possible clarifications of it:
1) ‘Socrates sipping, rather than guzzling, hemlock explains why he died.’ (Seems wrong.)
2) ‘Socrates sipping hemlock, rather than wine, explains why he died.’ (Seems right again.)
The lesson is that explanatory properties are sensitive to choice of contrast. As well as the cause slot, a similar lesson applies to the effect slot too. To see that, imagine that a short circuit ignites a mixture of wood and potassium salts, yielding a purple fire. Then:
1) The short circuit explains the purple fire rather than no fire.
2) But it’s the potassium salts that explain the purple fire rather than yellow fire.
The contrastive view dates from (Dretske 1972). Notable developments of it include (Van Fraassen 1980), (Garfinkel 1981), (Achinstein 1983), (Hitchcock 1996), and – most influential recently – (Woodward 2003).​[2]​ I leave further details and justifications to those works, and here focus instead on how to apply a contrastive apparatus to innateness. 

Begin with the explanandum, i.e. with the object of an innateness ascription. I shall assume initially, in common with the literature, that this is always a particular actual phenotypic trait, label it Ta. In accordance with the above, it is crucial also to specify a contrast to Ta, so label that T*. To see intuitively how choice of T* matters, consider Ta = my legs, and T* = I have only one leg. This represents a paradigm case of an innate trait – what about me could be more innate than that I have two legs rather than one? Now, as it happens, one of my legs is actually slightly bent due to a childhood accident. This suggests an alternative contrast of T* = my two legs are both straight. In order to explain why my leg is bent rather than straight, i.e. Ta rather than this new T*, we would appeal now to my accident and not to innateness. Yet Ta is identical in both cases, namely my actual legs. That is, for the first choice of T* we deem genes not environment to be explanatory, and thus Ta to be innate, while for the second choice of T* it is just the reverse.​[3]​ ​[4]​ (In all examples, I shall take it that the asserted judgments of innateness reflect those of experts as well as mere folk intuition.)





We may now formulate an explicit definition. It is intended to apply to token cases, i.e. to particular traits of particular organisms, on which more shortly. Let T be a function that takes an organism’s causal history as input, and yields trait values as outputs. Formally, let Ta = the actual trait value; Ga = the actual genome at conception; and Ea = the rest of the actual developmental history. And let T* = the salient contrast trait value; G* = the salient contrast history resulting from the substitution​[8]​ in of an alternative genome at conception; and let E* = the salient contrast history resulting from the substitution in of an alternative event other than the genome at conception.​[9]​

Some clarifications from the start may help. T*, G*, and E* are all counterfactuals. For ease of exposition, I shall often denote a G* or E* just by the alternative substituted in, for instance ‘G* = alternative genome X’. For both G* and E*, the only differences from the actual history are, to repeat, the initial substitution itself plus that substitution’s causal consequences. In all cases, the contrast explanandum will be a T*, and the contrast explanans either a G* or an E*.

Then, our definition is:

1) When a G* is salient, Ta is innate iff: T(G*) = T*
2) When an E* is salient, Ta is innate iff: T(E*) ≠ T*		[INN]

T(G*) denotes the trait that would have resulted from the alternative causal history represented by G*, and similarly for T(E*) and E*. On a contrastive view, the conditions for full explanation are: that the actual cause yields the actual effect; and that the contrast-cause would have yielded the contrast-effect. The first condition is satisfied automatically here, since by assumption T(Ga&Ea) = Ta.​[10]​ The second condition is satisfied when T(G*) = T* or T(E*) = T*, depending on whether it is a G* or E* that is salient. Intuitively, therefore, definition [INN] amounts to saying that a trait is innate just in case it is explained by genes​[11]​, i.e. T(G*) = T*, or it is not explained by environment, i.e. T(E*) ≠ T*. Given that T(Ga&Ea) = Ta, ascriptions of innateness thus amount to evaluations of particular counterfactuals.​[12]​

It is important to be clear here on the type-token distinction. Definition [INN] applies only to the token case of a particular trait of a particular organism. Which contrasts T*, G* and E* are salient will obviously vary with context. Moreover, the function T is essentially a device for representing causal relations, and such relations are also context-dependent. Whether striking a match causes fir, for instance, depends on whether the match is wet, whether there is sufficient oxygen, whether it is windy, etc. Actual ascriptions of innateness, in contrast, are typically made at the type level – ‘Down’s syndrome is innate’ or ‘suntans are not innate’. How then can [INN] be applied to them? The answer is that such type claims (as I read them) are implicitly about particular populations of token cases. In particular, usually they tacitly assume ‘typical’ or ‘normal’ populations and explanatory concerns, corresponding to particular (collections of) choices of T* and G* or E*. The utility I eventually assert for ascriptions of innateness (section 7) will concern interventions at the token level. Population-level interventions will thus be licensed only relative to particular populations, i.e. relative to particular aggregations of token cases. 

Turn next to a common worry – namely, does it make sense to talk of contrasting only one of genes and environment in isolation, given the two factors’ obvious continual interaction? But this worry is misplaced. To see why, and anticipating cases of the kind to be discussed later, suppose I had been born with greater athletic talent.​[13]​ Possession of a more athletic genome would presumably have led to a different environment too (relative to the one I actually did experience) since of course this greater talent would likely have led me to seek, and to have been given, more intensive athletic training. But this does not render the counterfactual any harder to evaluate. That is, for any genetic contrast G* (or environmental one E*), the history need be held fixed only up to the time of the relevant substitution (see above). In causal modeling terms, there is no problem if the subsequent history changes too, so long as it does so only as a causal consequence of the initial intervention (Woodward 2003).

Finally, two other notes. First, unlike, for instance, the definitions of (Prinz 2002) or (Samuels 2002), [INN] is applicable to biological and psychological traits alike, and indeed to any effect whose causes may be partitioned between initial genome and remaining developmental history. Second, [INN] yields a dichotomous verdict. In any particular case, i.e. once salient contrasts are specified, innateness is either endorsed or it isn’t, thereby corresponding to folk usage.


4) Objectivity and context
It follows from definition [INN] that innateness is a relational property, of the form Ta is innate relative to T* and G* (or to T* and E*, as the case may be). There is no absolute fact of the matter, independent of explanatory context. More formally, whenever we ask whether some trait is innate, on my view a presupposition of the question is a particular specification of contrasts. That these relativizations are not explicit in ordinary discourse does not show that they are not present, only that they are tacit. I think the intuition against the thought that the same trait could be both innate and not innate, is explained as being the result of a violation of pragmatic maxims enjoining relevance to our conversational presuppositions (in particular, to the presupposition fixing only a particular specification of contrasts as salient).

Such a relational property is non-arbitrary and metaphysically well motivated. In particular, once (but only once) given a specification of contrasts, the truth of an innateness ascription is clearly objective – or anyway as objective as the evaluations of the relevant counterfactuals. It is thus certainly possible to rule out some ascriptions of innateness as erroneous. For example, assertions that human criminality is innate may, in context, be assertions that even given different upbringing or schooling, still certain individuals would have committed crimes anyway. That claim in turn is objectively testable by science in the usual way.​[14]​

Often, contrasts are not specified explicitly. Therefore we still require an account of how, in those cases, they are determined implicitly. The answer, as already mentioned and as for any conversational presupposition, is conversational context. Can we flesh that out in more detail? One general constraint we have already seen – contrasts are counterfactual, i.e. T* ≠ Ta, and neither G* nor E* replicates the organism’s actual developmental history (‘GEa’, say). A further general constraint is that contrasts must, so to speak, genuinely contrast. I propose that Ta and GEa must each be nomologically incompatible with their associated contrasts. (This ensures that Ta and GEa constrain the definition at all.) However, it also remains true that, beyond this, there exists no generally agreed formal procedure for nailing down in every case exactly how circumstances do specify choice of contrast.​[15]​ How then can we ever be confident that the contrasts guiding our judgments of innateness are indeed the ones claimed? The best way, it seems to me, and therefore the best evidence for [INN], is deliberately to manipulate choice of contrast and then to track whether ascriptions of innateness consequently vary in the manner predicted. Obviously, no exhaustive catalogue of cases is possible so I can only appeal to particular illustrative examples, here and throughout.

To this end, consider Ta = my height. Suppose I ask the explanatory question, why am I taller than a pygmy? This immediately suggests the contrast T* = a pygmy’s typical height, and, roughly speaking, either G* = a pygmy raised in my environment, or E* = me raised in a pygmy’s environment. For these, we immediately judge that a pygmy would only reach a pygmy’s typical height even in my environment, i.e. T(G*) = T*, and that I would have exceeded a pygmy’s typical height even if raised in their environment, i.e. T(E*) ≠ T*. And sure enough, we correspondingly judge that my height advantage over the pygmy is indeed innate – because explained by my genes but not by my environment.

Next, suppose I set, for the same actual trait Ta = my height, a different conversational context by asking, why am I taller than my father? Now the contrasts are naturally T* = my father’s height, and, roughly speaking, either G* = my father raised in my environment, or E* = me raised in my father’s environment. Because I judge that my father would likely have reached my height if he’d had my nutritionally superior upbringing, i.e. that T(G*) ≠ T*, therefore our height difference is not explained by genes and so judged not innate. Similarly, if I believe that I would have attained only my father’s height given his upbringing, i.e. that T(E*) = T*, then our height difference is explained by environment and again I accordingly judge it not innate. That is, judgment of innateness again tracks the predictions of [INN].

Notice how the very same trait, namely my height, is thus deemed innate in some explanatory contexts but not in others. Indeed, according to [INN], a similar fate awaits any trait. We already (section 2) saw this also for Ta = my legs. Consider one further case now, familiar from the literature. In some species, the very same bee may develop into a queen or worker, depending only on its diet during a critical phase of development. Is it therefore innate that a particular bee is a worker (Ta) rather than a queen (T*)? Well, both ‘no’ and ‘yes’ – which embarrasses the literature, but not [INN]. 

First, ‘no’, because the bee becoming a worker is explained by diet, i.e. by environment. This answer highlights E* = a queen’s diet during the critical phase of development, so that T(E*) = T*. Thus [INN] endorses the judgment that Ta is not innate, as desired. Second, ‘yes’, because Ta is also explained by the innate pattern of dependence on diet, i.e. by genes. A different pattern, and the bee might not have become a worker even given its diet. This answer highlights G* = a genome at conception not typical of this species, i.e. one associated with some different pattern of dependence, for which T(G*) = T*. For this new explanatory context, [INN] thus endorses the judgment that Ta is innate, again as desired.

Further intricacies of the bee example also now become readily explicable. For instance, once set on the worker developmental path, the bee’s worker status is thereafter programmed innately because no longer explained by environment. This corresponds to T(E*) ≠ T*, for e.g. E* = a changed diet after the critical phase of development. On the other hand, in another context the bee’s worker status is not explained by genes, i.e. is not innate, because its exact bee genome was irrelevant. This corresponds to T(G*) ≠ T*, for G* = an alternative genome at conception from within the same bee species.


5) Dispositions versus traits
The conditions of adult membership to the Philharmonic Academy in Bologna required a candidate to write an elaborate motet in six parts, founded upon a melody assigned from the Roman Antiphonarium, the work to conform to the strictest rules, with double counterpoint and fugue. In the summer of 1770, the Academy was visited by a 14-year-old boy who tried the test. In less than three-quarters of an hour he rapped at his door and asked to be let out. The authorities sent him word not to be discouraged, but to keep on trying, as he had yet three hours, and might accomplish it. They were greatly astonished on finding that he had already finished, having produced a complete master work, abundantly up to all requirements, the whole written in a peculiarly neat and accurate manner. The 14-year-old boy was the young Mozart.​[16]​


A frequent analysis of innateness is in terms of environmental invariance. In our notation, such invariance may be expressed formally: T(E*) = Ta, for some range of E* contrasts. I return to invariance definitions later. Here, I want to focus on an important objection to them that does not seem to have appeared in the literature before. My motivation is twofold: first, the objection applies to all definitions framed wholly or partly in terms of environmental invariance, and that includes [INN]. Second, the resultant analysis will turn out to be essential to any satisfactory account of innateness more generally.

Mozart’s musical talent is a paradigm case of something innate. Let Ta = Mozart’s feat aged 14 of writing the Bologna motet in 45 minutes. Like all traits, Ta was the product of both genetic and environmental inputs. But Ta required not just normal environmental inputs of nutrients and nurture. Rather, something much less commonplace was also necessary, namely that almost from infancy Mozart was hot-housed as a prodigy by his musician father.​[17]​ Ta presumably therefore cannot qualify as innate under an invariance definition, since it is precisely not invariant with respect to a large range of environments.​[18]​ How then can we capture that which is innate about Mozart’s talent? The solution, I shall argue, lies in the notion of innate dispositions. In particular, talents must be explicated as dispositions rather than traits.

Begin with the analysis of dispositions generally. Paradigmatically, a given vase is fragile iff it shatters when struck. What is the biological analogue? Label the relevant disposition here, corresponding to fragility, D = Mozart’s musical talent. Corresponding to the shattering, i.e. to the realization of the disposition, we have the trait Ta = Mozart’s feat of writing the motet in 45 minutes. Corresponding to the striking of the vase, i.e. to the relevant environment, we have Ea = Mozart’s actual childhood hot-housing. Then, by definition of a disposition, Mozart has the disposition D iff Ta when Ea.​[19]​ So far, that just says that D is a disposition. What does it mean to say that it is an innate one? I propose to identify innate dispositions with genetic dispositions, i.e. to dispositional properties of the particular genome at conception. Thus innate dispositions, unlike most innate traits, are things we do possess literally from conception.

Of course, because genes feature in the causal history of any trait, it follows that all traits – innate and non-innate alike – are realizations of genetic dispositions.​[20]​ So on the face of it, appeals to the innateness of a disposition seem rather vacuous. Why then should such appeals ever be made? Because, it turns out, in particular circumstances ascriptions of innateness to dispositions can be informative after all. Tracing exactly how will be intricate work.

Begin on the genetic side. Continuing with the Mozart case for illustration, recall that D is a property of Mozart’s actual genome at conception Ga, that Ta = his musical feats, and Ea = his actual hot-housing environment. What of the salient contrast genome G*? There are two possibilities – either G* has disposition D too, or it does not. Only in the latter case, it turns out, will invocation of an innate disposition be useful and hence conversationally apt. Assume to start with that the latter case indeed applies. Because therefore G* does not have D whereas Ga does, it follows from the definition of a disposition that:
1) Ga implies Ta when Ea; and 
2) G* implies not-Ta when Ea. 
Labeling as usual by T* the salient contrast to Ta, this just amounts to:
1) T(Ga) = Ta; and 
2) T(G*) = T*.​[21]​
In my view, the pragmatic import of the claim that D is innate is to highlight the contrast regarding dispositional properties between Ga and the salient G*. Here, we already know claim 1, i.e. that T(Ga) = Ta – that is just the actual case. So the contrast between Ga and G* boils down to claim 2. And claim 2 is, recall, just one half of our definition of an innate trait. In other words, given that the salient contrast for the explanans is genetic, asserting that a trait Ta is innate and asserting that the underlying disposition D that it realizes is innate, amount to exactly the same claim – namely, that T(G*) = T*.

All this, recall, was on the assumption that G* does not possess D. Now suppose on the contrary that G* does possess D. What then? It would follow that G* implies Ta when Ea, and hence that T(G*) ≠ T*. In other words, with respect to the explanandum Ta-rather-than-T*, Ga-rather-than-G* no longer makes a difference, and thus appealing to genes is no longer explanatory. In such circumstances, my claim is that assertion of D’s innateness does not serve any pragmatic purpose. For that reason, such assertions are only made in the earlier case, i.e. when T(G*) = T*. Intuitively, innate dispositions are appealed to only when genes are explanatory.

Turn next to the second half of the story, so to speak – to when the salient contrast for the explanans is environmental, i.e. some E*. The key point is that a genome either does or doesn’t have a given disposition – regardless of environment. Thus Ga would still have disposition D given either Ea or E*. Recall, the definition of D is: Ta when Ea. To say that D holds given E* is therefore merely to assert the conditional ‘Ta when Ea’ when that conditional’s antecedent is false, i.e. when E*. Accordingly, that assertion will be (vacuously) true for any E*. Intuitively, Mozart would still have been born with his talent regardless of whether his upbringing subsequently enabled him actually to fulfill it. It follows that possession of a genetic disposition in itself implies nothing about what would have happened given E*. In particular, declaring a disposition innate therefore leaves it open whether or not T(E*) = T*.​[22]​

To appreciate the significance of that, recall that when an E* is salient, [INN] tells us that asserting a trait to be innate amounts to the claim T(E*) ≠ T*. But that latter claim is not true for Mozart. As we saw, given that Mozart’s musical feats depended on his childhood hot-housing, for a typical salient E* we find on the contrary that T(E*) = T*. That is precisely why the environmental invariance definition failed here. As it were, to capture what is innate about Mozart’s talent we must contrast only alternative genes, not alternative environments. Formally, his case satisfies only one half of our definition of an innate trait, namely the genetic half – but we see now that it satisfies all of the definition of an innate disposition, because the latter is conveniently silent about T(E*). And that is why, when expressing the innateness of Mozart’s talent, we appeal to disposition rather than trait.

The pay-off from this, finally, is that it shows us exactly when and why ascribing innateness to a disposition is useful. In particular, we assert a disposition rather than a trait to be innate iff the following pragmatic (1 and 4) and metaphysical (2 and 3) conditions are satisfied:
1) The explanatory context does not make it clear that G* rather than E* is the salient contrast
2) G* does not possess D, i.e. T(G*) = T*
3) T(E*) = T*
4) We wish (only) to assert T(G*) = T*.

Here is the reasoning. First, when true often we shall want to assert T(G*) = T*, i.e. that genes are explanatory, as doing so may have scientific value (section 7). In other words, often when condition 2 holds, 4 holds too. And often we may satisfy 4 simply by asserting the trait Ta to be innate since, when a G* is salient, that is just to assert that T(G*) = T*. But given also conditions 3 and 1, this usual strategy now fails, since asserting a trait’s innateness is also to assert that T(E*) ≠ T* in E* cases, i.e. that environment is not explanatory, and this second implication now becomes both false and potentially salient. My claim is that in such circumstances we may still assert T(G*) = T*, but now only by asserting instead that the underlying disposition is innate. Given condition 2, asserting the disposition’s innateness implies that T(G*) = T*. In G* cases, this merely replicates the implication of asserting the trait’s innateness. But given also conditions 3 and 1, the silence of innate dispositions regarding T(E*) – which distinguishes them from innate traits – now becomes decisively useful.

Thus the metaphysical implications of ascriptions of innateness to dispositions are derivable only indirectly, via pragmatic considerations. Intuitively, we appeal to dispositions when a trait is explained (in context) by both genes and environment, and we want to focus attention just on the genes side.

Again, the best evidence for this account is examination of how actual usage tracks explanatory context in just the way predicted. In the Mozart case, clearly T(G*) = T* and T(E*) = T*, i.e. both genes and environment are explanatory, i.e. conditions 2 and 3 hold. In many contexts, for example discussing his hot-housing, it will be unclear that G* is salient, i.e. condition 1 holds. The uniqueness of Mozart’s talent is captured by T(G*) = T*, where G* = other actual human genomes. So if in this context we wish to assert his talent’s uniqueness then we are meeting condition 4, and hence now all four conditions. Thus it is that we naturally appeal to Mozart’s ‘innate genius’ or ‘God-given talent’, i.e. ascribe now innateness to a disposition rather than a trait.

Here is another, more biological example. We would typically say that my having two feet is innate, i.e. ascribe innateness to a trait. But if it is pointed out that thalidomide in the womb may lead to no feet developing, we naturally revise our claim to saying only that I have an innate tendency to develop two feet, i.e. now ascribing innateness to a disposition. Why this change? Because, on this paper’s view, in the typical conversational context we do not have in mind those unusual environments in which two feet will not develop. Rather, we have in mind some more common E* where T(E*) ≠ T* (for T* = I do not have two feet, say​[23]​), and so we may ascribe innateness to the trait. But in a thalidomide conversational context, now E* = thalidomide in the womb, and so T(E*) = T*. In both cases, T(G*) = T* (say, for G* = some non-human genome at conception). The thalidomide context, but not the typical context, therefore fulfills conditions 2 and 3. Mere mention of thalidomide presumably may suggest E* rather than G* to be salient, thus fulfilling condition 1. Therefore if condition 4 also holds, i.e. if we wish to assert that my having a human genome explains my two feet, then we appeal to the tendency/disposition. Thus our account successfully explains our original datum, namely that when switching from the typical to the thalidomide conversational context we switch our ascription of innateness from trait to disposition.​[24]​

One more case, briefly: Tiger Woods hits the ball further than most other professional golfers. Announcers often mention his ‘natural length’, i.e. an innate trait. But when comparing the length of the constantly training adult Woods to that of his ten-year-old childhood self, thus switching the contrast from G* = genomes of other golfers to E* = not constantly training, the comment becomes instead how he has fulfilled his ‘natural talent’, i.e. an innate disposition.

This section has staked out virgin territory. No other definition in the literature has any such analysis of the relation between innate dispositions and innate traits. Yet tracking the interventions associated with innateness will demand this understanding (section 7). Moreover, our account explains why appeal to dispositions is likely when T(E*) = T* and when G* does not possess D. Prime generators of such contexts are human traits that are non-universal and environmentally sensitive. And such traits often turn out to be precisely the subjects of the most famous nature-nurture disputes. Besides high musical ability, examples include homosexuality, alcoholism, schizophrenia, high scores on IQ tests, high athletic ability, and  many cancers. A good analysis of innate dispositions is therefore vital for precisely those hot-button controversies that are one of the main things we want an account of innateness for.​[25]​


6) Relation to previous definitions
Turn now to the many other definitions of innateness in the literature. Two general problems with them arise immediately. First, none has any detailed account of the relation between innate traits and dispositions. As a result, all offer either an incomplete analysis of Mozart-type cases or just no analysis at all. Second, (almost) all of the proposed definitions are context-insensitive. Thus none can accommodate the very same trait being innate in some contexts but not in others.

The force just of these initial remarks bears emphasis. For instance, focusing only on the second, any trait whose innateness is judged to vary with context is a counterexample to any non-relational definition. As I have argued, such variability is true of every trait, and (ignoring Ariew 2007 for a moment) all previous definitions are non-relational in the sense of delivering only one verdict per trait. Strictly speaking, therefore, the dramatic conclusion is that every trait is a counterexample to all previous definitions. The situation could hardly be much worse!

Generally, I think [INN] captures that which is appealing in other definitions while avoiding their difficulties. There is space only to sketch this claim here; for a full critical survey of a large literature, see (Mameli and Bateson 2006). Begin with the popular family of notions centered on genes. Of course, genes form part of the causal history of every trait, innate and non-innate alike, so some more discriminating connection than mere causation must be postulated. Candidates include that to be innate means to be variously genetically ‘determined’, ‘specified’, ‘influenced’, ‘pre-wired’, ‘encoded’, or ‘controlled’.​[26]​ The quoted metaphorical terms have all proved notoriously difficult to define rigorously while at the same time also suitably discriminatingly. But I think the appealing thought they share in common can be captured by saying that a trait is explained by genes, which in turn is given a precise formulation in [INN].​[27]​

Analogous remarks apply to the other half of the equation, so to speak, i.e. to defining innateness not by richness of genetic input but rather by poverty of environmental input. Again, environment forms part of the causal history of every trait, so some more discriminating (lack of) connection must be highlighted. Candidates include that an innate trait is one that is not ‘learned’; one that requires for its development no ‘information’ to be extracted from the environment; or one that is not environmentally ‘induced’.​[28]​ A simple environmental invariance account identifies innateness with not varying across a range of environments (Sober 1998, Stich 1975). More sophisticated versions specify exactly what range and kind of invariance is relevant (Mallon and Weinberg 2006). The central thoughts here are spoken to in [INN] by defining as innate that which is not explained by environment. Again, this avoids well known problems fleshing out satisfactory definitions of the quoted concepts, as well as, in the case of invariance accounts, problems defining non-circularly the appropriate range of environments.

Another line of thought, common in cognitive science, identifies innateness with species-typicality, and – in the case of evolutionary psychology in particular – sometimes also with being a Darwinian adaptation.​[29]​ It is naturally captured under our definition by such explanatory contexts implying G* = a genome of a different species, or G* = some maladaptive genome. A trait has also been defined to be innate just when it is generatively entrenched, i.e. when the development and functioning of other features in an organism depends on it, thus leading to strong stabilizing selection for that trait (Wimsatt 1999). [INN] captures how an entrenched trait is thus insensitive to a wide range of environmental variation and usually best explained genetically.

Often, phenomena proposed as definitions of innateness I think are better seen instead as useful evidence for particular ascriptions of it, i.e. for particular evaluations of relevant counterfactuals. For example, Chomsky’s famous poverty of stimulus argument suggests, roughly speaking, that explicit instruction is not necessary for children to learn grammar, and hence that that learning is not sensitive to the fine details of a child’s specific environment – i.e. that, typically, T(E*) ≠ T*. Likewise, a species-typical timetable of ontogeny is evidence that most salient environmental contrasts make no difference, whereas the genetic contrast with alternative species does make a difference.

Perhaps the definition in the literature closest in sprit to [INN] is Andre Ariew’s identification of innateness with environmental canalization (1996, 1999, 2007). Such canalization is an observed feature of developmental trajectories. Like [INN], Ariew’s definition, at least in its most recent form, is relational. I believe it gives an excellent umbrella account of many, perhaps even all, cases where we use an ascription of innateness to assert that a trait’s development is robust with respect to environmental variation. My own view, however, is that Mozart cases show we need to supplement it with an explicit account of genetic explanation too (see also endnote 32). It is also unclear that it is sufficiently sensitive to choice of T* and, therefore, whether it captures fully how the innateness of any given trait varies with context.

Standard counterexamples to these various accounts are handled easily by [INN]. For instance, scars and suntans presumably involve no learning or extraction of information from the environment, yet are counted as not innate all the same. [INN] captures this judgment straightforwardly. Rather than run through all such counterexamples though, in the space here I shall concentrate instead just on one especially often cited category of problem case for definitions that, like [INN], invoke some form of insensitivity to environment. That category is traits that are universal yet acquired. The problem is that, intuitively, such traits cannot be innate precisely because they need to be acquired. Yet it seems that any environmental invariance formula must count them as innate nevertheless, since humans develop them reliably in all actual environments. Examples of such problem traits include the human belief that water is wet (Samuels 2002), or the presence of clostridium difficile bacteria in our intestines (Ariew 2007).

In reply, note that, unlike a simple invariance account, [INN] is framed in terms of counterfactuals. Therefore it is not obliged to deem a trait innate just because it is universal in actuality. On the contrary, the context of presentation here emphasizes precisely that, for instance, the belief that water is wet is learned, i.e. foregrounds the contrast E* = we never learned that water is wet. For Ta = belief that water is wet, and obvious T* = no belief that water is wet, it follows that T(E*) = T*, i.e. that our belief in water’s wetness is explained by environment and therefore that, just as desired, it is deemed by [INN] not innate.

Perhaps, the objector might retort, invocation of this particular E* is more convenient than justified? As before, the best reply is deliberately to manipulate implied contrasts and then to see whether our judgment of innateness adjusts as predicted. In particular, can we here, as our definition claims that we can in general, manipulate the context so as to generate the judgment that belief in water’s wetness is innate after all? I believe so. Suppose, for instance, we ask why I, but not a banana, have the belief that water is wet? The obvious contrast now is a genetic one, namely G* = a banana genome. Then T(G*) = T*, i.e. Ta is explained by my having human rather than banana genes, and so [INN] tells us that Ta is innate. And sure enough, in this explanatory context our judgment of innateness does change. Obviously, no banana can form beliefs of any kind, and that difference between it and me is innate. (If further contextual nudging towards G* rather than E* is required, we may speak of my disposition to form the belief as being innate.)


7) Innateness and science
Matteo Mameli and Patrick Bateson urge that the innate/non-innate distinction has a legitimate role to play only if it is useful to science (2006, 156). Like many, I endorse this proposed criterion. So, how might innateness be so useful? I think that the answer is one familiar from anti-reductionist work in philosophy of science – namely, that innateness is a useful higher-level predicate. In particular, it enables us to track useful higher-level regularities that we would otherwise overlook (see also Ariew 2007).​[30]​

What unites eye color, number of legs, and the ability to smile? At the micro level, very little – the mechanisms underpinning the development of each of these traits are presumably very different. Innateness is multiply realizable. Yet at the macro level, these traits are united by the fact that for a huge range of contexts no salient alternative environment could alter them, or could have done so in the past. This commonality is useful knowledge if modeling the traits’ evolutionary history, for instance, or if advising on early childhood development, and is captured precisely by declaring them innate (see also (Fodor 2001, 101-2)). Similarly, what unites superior talent in domains such as music, athletics, and comedy? Again, at the micro level presumably nothing does, yet useful regularities exist at a higher level. For instance, given any salient coaching regimen, in all these domains only the talented can attain the top level of performance. No analysis couched in terms of lower-level biological mechanisms and concepts, such as generative entrenchment, genetic programming, learning, Darwinian adaptation, species-typicality, etc, is able to track these regularities in the same way.

As the above suggests, the counterfactuals that comprise ascriptions of innateness are also exactly those that license interventions. Declaring my eye color innate, for instance, asserts that no salient environmental intervention could have altered it in the past, or could alter it now. In the Mozart case, when declaring his talent innate we assert that we could not train others up to his musical level simply by administering the same childhood hot-housing.​[31]​ ​[32]​ And when declaring Mozart’s musical feats not innate we assert that they did nonetheless also depend on that hot-housing, in other words that an intervention to remove the hot-housing would have resulted in no such feats.

Ascriptions of innateness thus serve to pick out which interventions are (or would have been) efficacious. We might even speculate that the concept originated, long before modern science, for precisely this useful purpose. In context, we would be well advised to breed only for traits that are innate, for instance, and to intervene environmentally only when a trait is not innate. Innateness is a guide to action.

As just illustrated, the interventions guided by ascriptions of innateness are often non-biological. Perhaps this explains why interest in nature-nurture debates comes as often from social as from biological scientists. Another reason for that, of course, may be that ascriptions of innateness are often politically charged. If a particular behavior is declared ‘innate’ for one sex but not the other, for instance, this might easily be taken to have consequences for policy. In this regard, it is vital to keep in mind the context-specificity of all such ascriptions, and thus of all such licensed interventions. Famously, being explained by genes does not necessarily imply the inefficacy (or efficacy) of some environmental intervention, for instance.

Innateness is sometimes a guide to moral responsibility more subtly too, at least when the latter tracks explanatory responsibility. Of course, in so far as our choice of salient contrast is dictated by moral judgment, ascriptions of innateness may also serve merely to express that judgment rather than to guide it. For example, male bellies tend to expand with age. This phenomenon is innate in the sense of occurring in a wide range of environments and for a wide range of human genomes, but it is also not innate in the sense that it could be avoided by eating less. The particular interventions implied by a defensive middle-aged male’s ascription of innateness, may both guide others’ moral reactions and also reflect their own.​[33]​

On many views, such interventions are closely (even definitionally) tied to causation, and in turn the discovery of causes is precisely the business of science, or at least of the special sciences. So a discovery of innateness can be a great scientific triumph. Nevertheless, even such discoveries may still disappoint some. For example, it may be important to evolutionary psychology to establish a strong correlation for human cognitive traits between being an adaptation, being environmentally canalized, and being species-typical (Mameli and Bateson 2006, 181). But, on our account, that issue cannot magically be settled one way or the other merely by ascriptions of innateness. Like any macro-predicate, innateness in itself tells us little about the mechanisms underpinning it at the ‘next level down’. In such cases indeed, as critics have pointed out, simplistic invocations of innateness may serve only to hinder science, blurring as they do the real issues of interest.

Similar remarks apply to the heated debates surrounding nativism in cognitive science. For example, all sides would agree that (in normal contexts) first language acquisition is – according to [INN] – innate. Thus all would agree, for instance, that we should not hold my particular upbringing responsible for my ability to speak, nor hold that this ability is the result of a unique talent of mine. Substantive disputes concern instead the mechanisms that explain these patterns in the gross counterfactuals. For instance, is all grammar learnt, or does the linguistic environment merely trigger one option from a grammatical toolbox that had already developed independently of learning? This is an interesting scientific question, but arguing over whether first language acquisition is innate is a poor way to articulate it. In common with all traits, first language acquisition is innate in some explanatory contexts and not in others. No doubt a few contexts can be generated in which the substantive disagreements do march in step with disagreements also over ascriptions of innateness. But more usually, framing the dispute in terms of innateness will again serve only to confuse.

This is hardly an unprecedented opinion, of course. Still, there is value in understanding better just what ascriptions of innateness do not tell us, as well as what they do. Further, I believe that [INN] elucidates the vexed question of just what nativism could amount to in the first place. It would follow from [INN] that, for instance, the truth of a nativism claim is sensitive, just like that of an innateness one, to explanatory context.





In light of the above, return now to the skeptical worries from section 1. One important criticism of the concept of innateness is that its continued use serves to blur important scientific distinctions (Griffiths 2002, Mameli and Bateson 2006). The examples above from evolutionary psychology and from nativism about language show how this blurring can impede scientific progress – what Matteo Mameli has called the “clutter hypothesis”. The problem is exacerbated by the innateness concept’s apparent deep (and cross-cultural) roots in folk-biological essentialism, meaning that it is difficult to eradicate from our thinking even once its demerits are recognized.

But these difficulties are not denied by [INN], rather they are elucidated. It is made clear, for instance, exactly why ascriptions of innateness will likely not advance research on first language acquisition. The real point though is that the same scheme can thus articulate these costs while simultaneously demonstrating that they are consistent with innateness having a positive role too. What [INN] shows, that is, is that the existence of the costs does not negate the existence also of the benefits.





Innateness is pragmatic. It is also a guide to action. In particular, the only defensible role that can be salvaged for it is the relational one captured by [INN]. That role is what enables it to license interventions. It also directs us to interpret ascriptions of innateness non-rigidly. If a trait is innate in one context, that – and the associated advice regarding interventions – may or may not carry over to a new context. Politically, remembering this may often be vital.

But a decision still remains. Even if we accept this paper’s analysis, nevertheless [INN] shows that innateness does reduce to a particular combination of genetic and environmental explanation and is therefore in principle eliminable. On one hand, as we have seen, it might be argued that indeed it should be so eliminated. After all, this thought runs, innateness brings with it misleading essentialist baggage, and is too easily abused to blur important scientific distinctions thereby harming research. Better, then, to replace it with the cleaner notion of explanation as understood in the way prescribed here. On the other hand, the concept persists in many areas of science, as well as more widely, and [INN] shows why – claims of innateness are convenient shorthand for claims about interventions past and present. Innateness serves this function better than other biological concepts. For that reason, it has not gone away but rather has been cherished for its usefulness. Moreover, [INN] also makes clear just when invocation of innateness is not useful to science. Overall, there is value in this normative clarification of well entrenched practice and, the response concludes, that is a more productive road here for philosophy of science than is utopian eliminativism.
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^1	  There is one partial exception in the case of the first feature, i.e. there is one precursor relational definition, namely (Ariew 2007). I discuss that later.
^2	  That causal explanation contains a pragmatic element has been a familiar idea at least since Davidson. I suspect that the central arguments of this paper do not turn on formulating this element contrastively rather than in some other way, but there is no space to argue for that properly here, nor to review the rest of the large explanation literature.A more radical step would be to claim that not just explanation but also causation itself is contrastive (Schaffer 2005, Maslen 2004). On such a view, choice of contrast would influence not just whether genes or environment explain some trait, but also whether they cause it. However, I remain neutral here on this further metaphysical issue, as this paper’s arguments remain of equal interest even if we interpret innateness claims to be just explanatory.
^3	  The different choices of contrast can be seen here as a formal device to pick out different aspects of my legs – respectively, their number and their straightness. Choice of T* can also serve to represent the distinction (Sober 1998, 795) between a trait’s initial development and its subsequent modifiability.
^4	  As (Mallon and Weinberg 2006, 325) point out, the objects of innateness ascriptions may form a broader class than ‘traits’ as that term is customarily used in biology. Generally, I shall ignore controversies over exactly how traits should be defined and individuated, and instead shall use the term rather liberally. (In this respect I am following the entire philosophical innateness literature, not to mention many biologists too.)On some views, for instance, the single event of my currently having my actual legs can, strictly speaking, correspond to more than one trait, depending on whether we are focusing on my legs’ number or straightness. In effect, this would be to individuate traits in part via explanatory context, thus rendering specification of T* otiose. But I shall understand the relata of a causal explanation to be two pairs of events, or more precisely, two pairs of an actual and contrast event, and my eventual definition of innateness will be framed accordingly. Therefore I retain the text’s specifications of Ta and T* both here and elsewhere, even at the cost of occasional conflict with some views of trait individuation.(The substance of this paper’s case could be made even given other choices of explanatory relata, and for ease of exposition I shall therefore sometimes leave it underspecified exactly what kinds these relata are.)
^5	  Some suggested definitions, such as identifying innateness with being a Darwinian adaptation, do implicitly appeal to a trait’s more distant history. I discuss those in section 6.
^6	  ‘Environment’ will therefore be taken here to include causal history both inside and outside an organism’s body.
^7	  In principle, of course, one could formulate contrasts that vary both these aspects of the explanans. As a matter of fact, such ‘combined’ contrasts do not ever seem to be salient in actual disputes (see also Van Fraassen 1980, 126). But if they were, in my view consideration of them would give us no information regarding innateness.
^8	  ‘Substitution’ is intended here as a neutral term that may be taken to correspond either to a ‘miracle’ in Lewis-style possible-worlds semantics, or to an ‘intervention’ in the semantics of the causal modeling literature. For the purpose of elucidating innateness I do not endorse any particular semantics for counterfactuals in general, since that is not the salient locus of philosophical dispute.
^9	  In general, T*, G* and E* may refer to sets of contrasts. For ease of exposition, I shall often assume them to be singleton. Although there is no space to demonstrate it here, a definition analogous to [INN] may easily be formulated in non-singleton cases too.
^10	  Strictly, this assumption only holds given determinism. For simplicity, I shall consider here only the deterministic case. Evaluation of indeterministic counterfactuals, and of probabilistic causal-explanatory claims more generally, goes beyond the scope of this paper. In practice, uncertainty due to indeterminism seems only rarely to be the salient focus of actual disputes about claims of innateness.
^11	  This formulation of genetic explanation is similar to others’. It shares the emphasis on pragmatic relativization in (Gannett 1999), for instance, and the emphasis on the token case of (Waters 1994)’s ‘Difference Principle’. Mameli and Bateson also mention the essential idea somewhat intuitively (2006, 162, footnote 2).
^12	  Of course, as with all counterfactuals, these ones may be ambiguous or ill specified. In so far as they are, then so likewise I claim are the associated ascriptions of innateness.
^13	  Of course, on some views of personal identity this more athletic creature would no longer be ‘me’ at all. For our purposes, the difficulty is not a deep one. If desired, the discussion can be re-phrased without loss to whether a counterpart with the particular alternative genome at conception would have ended up with the same traits as me.
^14	  Some phrasing in this and the previous paragraph is adapted from (Cohen 2004).
^15	  See Schaffer (2005), Maslen (2004) and Van Fraassen (1980) for further discussion.
^16	  Adapted from http://www.tribalsmile.com/music/article_459.shtml
^17	  Later in life, Mozart himself commented on the necessity of an intensive environmental input: “People make a mistake who think that my art has come easily to me. Nobody has devoted so much time and thought to composition as I. There is not a famous master whose music I have not studied over and over.”
^18	  For the rest of us, in possession of non-Mozartian genomes, there is environmental invariance because in almost any environment Ta would still remain sadly absent. But the particular innateness we are trying to capture concerns Mozart’s talent, not everyone else’s lack of it.
^19	  I stay neutral here on the vexed metaphysical issue of dispositional realism. Thus I take no position on whether a trait is also explained by an underlying disposition in addition merely to realizing it.
^20	  Therefore disposition is the broader category of innateness here. All innate traits are realizations of innate dispositions, but innate dispositions – when realized at all – may be realized by traits that are either innate or non-innate.
^21	  Strictly speaking, the second condition only follows if the salient aspects of Ea are still present even when G* is substituted in for Ga. When asserting that the non-Mozartian alternative person does not possess Mozart’s talent, for example, we are asserting that he or she would not have been able to perform Mozart’s musical feats even given the same hot-housing upbringing. In turn, that assertion is captured by the condition T(G*) = T* only if we assume that the alternative person would indeed have received the same hot-housing that Mozart did. (Mozart’s siblings did.)Formally, this could be added to the four conditions to be presented shortly in the text.
^22	  Again, strictly speaking this requires that E* implies the absence of the salient aspects of Ea. For instance, absence of D would indeed make a difference in an alternative environment in which Mozart still received his hot-housing, but now drank water instead of juice. However, fortunately, in practice the salient E* will typically be one that does change precisely the crucial element of Ea – that is why it is salient. (Again, formally this could be added to the four conditions to be presented shortly in the text.)
^23	  When citing a negation as a contrast, I do not mean to suggest any commitment to the existence of negative events. Rather, such usages should always be interpreted as shorthand for particular positive contrast events (or sets of them).
^24	  Note we are also licensed to claim that, in contrast to some hypothetical thalidomide-resistant creature, a human has an innate disposition to develop no feet in a thalidomide-bathed prenatal environment. Although strange in most contexts, it seems to me that this claim is exactly right in this context.
^25	  For example, because, rightly or wrongly, moral charge is attached to some environmental explanations but rarely to genetic ones, there is motivation (for some) to describe homosexuality or alcoholism as innate traits rather than innate dispositions even in advance of the full scientific story. This paper’s analysis explains that by doing so one is thereby precluding the possibility of a salient environmental explanation. Conversely, insisting that one is merely innately disposed to developing such traits does not rule out T(E*) = T*. It thus leaves open the possibility that a salient alternative history, perhaps featuring a different upbringing or different personal choices, could have resulted (or could still result) in a different outcome.
^26	  Among eminent recent promoters of versions of the genetic idea in particular are: Baron-Cohen 2003, Chomsky 2000, Fodor 2001, Marcus 2004, Pinker 2004.
^27	  Any appealing aspects of the otherwise clearly dubious identification of innateness with statistical heritability, can also be retained by appealing instead to genetic explanation.
^28	  Prinz 2002, Samuels 2002, Gilbert 2003. There is also overlap with many of the genetic accounts mentioned previously, as attempts to define genetic ‘encoding’ and so forth themselves often end up invoking lack of some kind of environmental input.
^29	  Examples include (Buss 2003) and (Barkow et al 1992), especially the pieces in the latter by Symons and by Cosmides and Tooby.
^30	  One idea I believe to be a red herring here is that of the cluster concept. The thought is that if the various candidate definitions of innateness overlap sufficiently then ambiguity would be minimized and so the concept’s use by science be justified (Mameli and Bateson 2006, 182-3). But usefulness as a higher-level predicate in no way depends on the different definitions overlapping. Indeed, arguably it requires multiple realizability, i.e. that the lower-level candidate definitions do not overlap.
^31	  Notice the vindication here for the work of section 5, namely the understanding from there of exactly which counterfactual entailments are implied by ascriptions of innateness to dispositions.
^32	  Therefore I do not think that environmental canalization can be the entire story of innateness. For ascriptions of innateness prove a useful guide to interventions on genes as well as environment, and moreover with regard to traits, such as Mozart’s musical feats, that are highly sensitive to environmental variation and so that are not examples of such canalization.
^33	  As for many traits, I have no clear intuition whether expanding male bellies simpliciter ‘are innate’. Rather, my judgment only becomes clear once given a particular explanatory context, just in the manner that [INN] – but no other theory of innateness – predicts.
^34	  On the contrastive approach, a lack of environmental explanation does not in itself imply the presence of genetic explanation, because any explanatory claim is relativized to choice of contrast. For some pairs G* and E*, neither may be explanatory (with respect to the salient T*).
